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Grappling with "globalization" in East Asia
I am deeply grateful that I was given the opportunity to serve the Graduate School
of Asia-Pacific Studies of Waseda University as Professor for Chinese and Japanese
Studies from 1998 to 2006. In this contribution I should like to present a brief summary
of my activities, by first providing an overview of my approach towards "globalization",
followed by a list of publications that appeared in this period.
I chose "Politics and Society in East Asia in the age of globalization" as the general
theme for my teaching and research. My major focus was on factors inauencmg
domestic and international stability, the role of elites and the exercise of power in
shaping a new future. The nineteenth and twentieth century had seen numerous
attempts to construct new polities and a new international order designed at the
drawing board, attempts that frequently ended in disaster or war. It soon became clear
that I was in need of using "story lines" as a starting point to grasp change in its
historical context. I used a narrowly deaned concept of identity (see below) to gain
insights into the reasons why the drawing board approach to modernization had to fail.
Nineteenth century Europe and its regional system of international relations among
sovereign states became the starting point for main stream theories. At the start of the
twenty冶rst century global order is still hierarchical, but the patterns of hierarchy,
actors, their identity, and the exercise of power have changed･ I used the analogy of the
franchise system in business to approach the study of the contemporary international
system. The breakdown of revolutionary order in China and the Soviet Union provides
ample examples for the longevity of indigenous social and political structures. On the
surface posト1952 Japan reinvented itself as a nation imbued with "Western" values only
to discover half a century on that the structure of Japan's identity still d滑ers sig-
n摘cantly.
The aftermath of the Cold Warralignment, and renewed differentiation
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new period in global history. The
twentieth century was characterized not only by rivalry among old and new nation
states, but also by competition among three ideologies that had originated in Europe:
capitalism, communism (or socialism), and fascism. State fascism died in 1945, and
dreams of communist inspired socialism barely survived the demise of the Soviet Union.
Capitalism was the victor, most powerfully represented by the lone global superpower,
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the United States of America. The victory seemed to prove that "capitalism as
embodied in models derived from the United States was more than just an e魚cient tool
for economic welfare. Coupled with democracy as its leading ideology it promised a
new world of justice and morality for all, irrespective of their native religious, civiliza-
tional and cultural traditions. Change is the result of the exercise of power-economic,
political, military and "soft power". Power is however not the exclusive preserve of the
rich and "powerful". Military power cannot easily or directly be translated into
long-lasting power in other areas. The allied occupation of Germany succeeded by
accepting that military power by itself could not achieve a democratic transformation.
Having witnessed the momentous changes occurring in Europe between 1989 and
1991 1 wondered what these changes entailed for the future of East Asia, and East Asia s
relations with Eurasia and the United States. China, India, Russia, Indonesia, Japan,
Nigeria, Brazil, and states deeply influenced by Islam as both a religion and a civiliza-
tion, together constitute the majority of the global population. Their traditions set them
apart from the idea of the "West" as represented by governments of the European Union
and the US. China, Japan, Russia, India amongst others reviewed their political, eco-
nomic and security strategies in particular in the period between 1994 and 1997. Japan
strengthened its cooperation with the United States at many levels. In 1997 Japan
unveiled its new Eurasian strategy, and endeavoured to increase regional cooperation in
(East) Asia, an initiative given some urgency by the economic crises that commenced in
the second part of that year. Chinese reform policies were essential in jumpstartmg
China's economy to become a truly global player, taking an active part in a host of
international organizations. The economic crises that started in 1997 reminded us that
the transition to a "new world" would not occur smoothly. Iraq, North Korea, Iran; ll
September 2001, Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein, and the GWOT (the Global War on
Terror) became key words of a new age, with a renewed struggle between ideals
defended by the "West" and its enemies. This new "Cold War'differed considerably
from the age of the struggle between "Socialism" and the "West" during the Cold War.
Widespread support for the War on Terror suggested a global alignment, a growing
consensus on visions for a future global order. On closer examination it appeared that
this was not necessarily the case in areas that reach from Eurasia and the Greater
Middle East to Africa and South America. The ability of North Korea and Iran to
withstand enormous international pressures, and the disastrous and tragic sequence of
events in Iraq are reminders that "power" - be it military and economic power, or the
power of religion, ideas and ideologies - cannot easily be calculated to shape the future.
As in the past states and individuals, are mostly unwilling to correct, or change
deep-seated convictions even when disproved by harsh realities. Words (concepts,
ideas) produce actions, and actions change perceptions of realities, but this process
remains di庁Icult to analyze.
United under the banner of "market democracy ?
The keywords of our day such as "market democracy" are less transparent than
suggested. "Market" is an institution mediating the production and consumption of
goods in which "economic power" is a major driving force. "Democracy with its
emphasis on equal voting rights is an institution that promises access to the distribution
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of "political" goods irrespective of "economic" power. Over the past four decades or
societies of many countries have seen a reduction in the power of democratic politics to
influence "economic" decision making: increasing independence of Central Banks from
direct control or interference of governments, and "privatization'as a pervasive phe-
nomenon in all spheres of our lives point to deep changes and shifting boundaries
between "politics" and the "economy '. This is reflected in shifts in academic discourse,
where thinking along lines of "economic" conceptualization, and economic models are a
direct reaection of changes in the "real'world. Thinking about globalization thus
requires reaection on the social context of academic theories, a realization that academic
discourse is a part of our assumed identities, rather than an objective means to
transcend subjective prejudice. Visions of "identity", including ideological convictions,
are easily confused with "truth", engendering a missionary zeal to remake the world into
ONE world consistent with ideology. Any catalogue of ideological, religious and legal
norms is insu魚cient to provide clear and unambiguous guidelines to action. To be
operative Bxed norms require complex institutions and elite leadership. Imams, rabbis,
Confucian scholarship and legal exegesis share similar tasks of reinterpreting fixed
canons. The Japanese Legal Office of the Cabinet内閣法制局has only a very small
staff, but is instrumental in producing a slow, but steadily changing interpretation of
the Japanese constitution. Any drastic reinterpretation might easily disrupt the魚ction
of consistency, and thus undermine the stable identities constitutions seek to protect.
Fixed world views-another manifestation of subjective identity- are also a major
cause of intelligence failures and a cause for war. The Opium War and its aftermath,
Ishiwara Kanji's religiously inspired visions of a "負nal war between Japan and the
United States, and Maoist dreams about remaking (Chinese) mankind were rooted in
visions of identity and dreams of creating one world, a consequence of an autistic
identity that refused to acknowledge that visions of the self are in perpetual need of
adjustment to reality. Ideas about a丘nal showdown between the US and China as a
future super power recall not only similar ideas prevalent m pre-war Japan, they are also
an echo of the deep impact of Darwinian ideas about the struggle for (national) survival
in Asia.
There is power pushing for change, and power to resist change
The tensions between idealized identity and reality continue m the age of a
so-called uni-polar world. The demise of the Soviet Union strengthened convictions that
market democracy as an ideology was proven right by the collapse of its mam opponent,
apparently obviating the need to test ideology and its consequences for the real world.
As Hans Maull observed:
"A balance-of-power approach to reality may, in fact, create a balance-of-power
world. Even if actors preferred qualitatively different foreign policy approaches,
they may feel forced to conform. Balance-of-power politics thus may tend to
homogenise international relations in dangerous ways."i
No single scholastic approach su魚ces to produce "truth" and new realities. History,
ideologies, religion, culture, but also the arts as evinced m advertising and on internet
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need to be taken into account. Dreams about reshaping the present must be placed in
a historical context. The power to cause change, and resistance to change are deeply
influenced by perceptions of all actors best analyzed in terms of "identity". I concluded
that "identity", if rigorously deBned, might be one good starting point for developing
tools appropriate for analyzing "power" in the age of globalization. The aim is much
more modest than the creation of a new theory of globalization. More than ever "power"
cannot be grasped by adopting a mono-disciplinary approach, and globalization de-
mands a re-emphasis on the role of elites and mass society in producing change, or
resistance to change.
Deja vu: power and hierarchy as keywords in deciphering global order
The rapid expansion of regional and global economic cooperation suggests increas-
ing horizontal linkages spanning the globe. At the same time, the expansion of military
power of the US, and the attempt to extend its system of military alliances and security
cooperation far beyond the scope seen during the Cold War, are witness to the strength-
ening of the hierarchical character of the international order.
The exercise of power in the modern world is unthinkable without alトpervasive
mstitutionalization, both at the level of formal government, but also in all areas of
human activities not directly controlled by government. Institutions are much more
than simple providers of "services , In order to function effectively institutions need
their own stable "philosophies", or identities, as well as月[exible leadership. Elites, like
any human being, are subject to errors and failures to obey common norms. Leadership
is required to produce月Iexible interpretations, and at times the will and power to ignore
and contradict institutionalized norms. The limits of power can also be measured by
gauging the ability to change "identities" over the long term.
"Globalization" has resulted in the need for instant access to information. The
increasing complexities of our world prevent any particular individual, but also collec-
tive decision making institutions such as parliaments, from the kind of rapid decision
making required ever more frequently. Decisions on exchange rates, stock markets, the
ever increasing risks in global markets demand decisions to be taken within minutes, if
not seconds/ The same applies to the world of military (in)security, exemplified in
challenges to effective deterrence, the functioning of an anti-missile shield, and prob-
lems of proliferation. Issues of nuclear armament and proliferation in North Korea and
Iran, both highly relevant to East Asia, have a structural character and cannot be
conclusively solved by merely focusing on the actions of these two governments. The
need for rapid decision making increases the need to give leaders greater discretion,
reduces possibilities for external supervision, and increases the potential of misuse of
power by elites. "Corruption" is only one example for the abuse of discretionary power,
but demonstrates the tensions between e魚cient decision making and the need to
maintain morality and justice, core values of our democratic identity. Moral identity
remains essential, and does constitute a brake on the arbitrary (mis)use of power.
Forming and educating global elites
The e魚cient exercise of power requires that elites need to be infused with a
common "identity '. The history of the Chinese imperial bureaucracy spans more than
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two millennia. It enabled the Chinese empire to produce homogenous elites that
originated from all parts of the huge region of the Chinese subcontinent, irrespective of
their local cultural tradition, language, or religion. The Chinese empire relied on a
numerically fairly small number of elites that were systematically trained and socialised
as supra-regional elites ( Confucianism , "examination system") to constitute an epis-
temic community engaged in the management of local and regional a庁airs. The
imperial government advocated the spread of a universally accepted form of govern-
ance, the use of a common language and culture among the elite, and maintained the
right to interfere in local (military) disturbances. China's population was often far from
docile - until the present day, Chinese peasants (老百姓) are famous for their "stubborn-
ness. Modern Chinese governments are just as concerned about controlling the masses
as were governments in the past, and that applies in particular to controlling secret
societies and some religious organisations as well (法輪功). The Chinese empire did not
impose one national language or uniform culture on the citizens of the empire, and
adopted different forms of taxation according to the economic structure of regions. It
accepted the widespread use of self-government both in the economy (会館, frequently
mistranslated as "guilds"), moral education (家訓"clan rules") and even parts of the
criminal law. In this sense, the organisation of the Chinese empire presents an early
paradigm for "globalisation". Needless to add, the pre-modern age provided only
relatively limited means to impose centralised political rule by force.
The mechanism by the Tokugawa central "military" government (the bakufu幕
府) may be interpreted as a precursor for systems of control over weapons of mass
destruction in the hands of local rulers (guns, swords), so characteristic of the globaliz-
mg world that seeks to prevent rogue states and groups of terrorists from threaten-
ing universal order. As recent research has demonstrated, the power of the central
government and domain (港) rulers was much more circumscribed by active or passive
resistance at the local level than pretentious documents issued by ruling elites sug-
gested. History provides numerous lessons for those who assume that "power is
su魚cient to change and transform societies by sheer force.
It is not only the different size, but also factors such as the completely different
pattern of relationship between local inhabitants and elites towards central govern一
merits shape qualitatively different structures of "national 'identity in Japan and China.
To impose modern visions of "national" Japanese or Chinese (Han漢民族) identity on
the premodern age is committing a serious anachronism.
Identity change in the age of globalization
During the Cold War the concept of the "Free World" involved a life and death
struggle that went far beyond a classic power struggle. Having grown up m West
Germany I still remember the slogan "rather dead than red. Conquest by Communism
might not only result in physical death, but lead to something worse: the loss of one's
moral identity. For religious believers it threatened hell to those succumbing to
atheism, but resistance held up the possibility of eternal life. This presented a classical
example how "identity may become a potent force for resistance to external enemies
and domestic change. Early discussions that eventually resulted in the establishment of
NATO it was clear that NATO was set up not only as a military alliance or to defend the
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security of member states, it was also entrusted with working towards a common moral,
political and economic identity among member states. In actual life the front lines of the
Cold War were less clear than suggested by images of a Bght between good and evil.
NATO operated in Europe and the Atlantic area, but most allies of the US in Asia-with
the notable exception of Japan-hardly qualified as democracies. It is striking that
alliance systems in Asia did not envisage the creation of common identities, and the
cooperation of authoritarian or elected governments to explore possibilities in that
direction. The benchmark criterion was the willingness of governments to oppose
communism, anticipating the more recent US concept of "alliance of the willing" that
bears so much similarity to communist inspired "United Front" tactics.-
The split between the Soviet Union and China went far beyond ideological hair
splitting or irreconcilable national interests. During its revolutionary phase the PRC
made it quite clear that it expected its socialist identity to become the model for a new
world order whose pillars would be the power of the poor of the world ("the Third
World ), epitomized by dreams of an axis Beijing-Jakarta in the early sixties, and a
strategy of encircling the industrialized world and choking off the supply of essential
raw materials. By 1993 the PRC became a net importer of oil, and increasingly
dependent on uninterrupted economic exchange for the arst time in China's entire
history. This has had a huge impact on China's political and security identity with
consequences that go far beyond a mere increase in power relative to its neighbors and
the US.
Japan recovered its formal sovereignty in 1952, and for the next three decades
cooperated with the United States closely on issues that ranged from the Korean War to
the Vietnam War. During this period Japan maintained a political, economic and
security identity that was explicitly different from that of the US. Prime Ministers like
Yoshida Shigeru and Ikeda were not in favor of permanent reliance on foreign military
power, and the liberal Ishibashi Tanzan stressed the importance of increasing Japan's
independence in defense as a corollary to self-determination and a sovereign, democratic
identity. Such opinions were placed squarely within an image of a "pacifist" Japan, and
its identity was enshrined in its peace constitution, in particular Article Nine. As I set
out in a recent publication4 developments in the seventies resulted in a basic change of
Japan s political discourse, culminating in the announcement of Japan's "Comprehen-
sive Security" concept (総合安全保障). Its basic ingredients originated from discus-
sions very similar to thinking of the Trilateral Commission. The "Comprehensive
Security concept itself has been much maligned, both within Japan and the United
States, but it was instrumental in changing basic parameters oHapan's discourse which
from the early eighties on moved much closer to that of the United States. Japan was
increasingly described as a "member of the West". This change of words implied much
more than a mere increase of a (still limited) cooperation at the level of security. This
trend continued in the nineties, and reached new heights during the Koizumi era when
shibboleths such as "privatization" became a mainstay of the "Koizumi reforms". A
closer examination of the privatization processes in Japan and China and their political
consequences demonstrates, however, that the interpretation of this fundamental con-
cept continues to differ greatly in Washington, Tokyo and Beijing. Globalization does
not automatically bring about a coalescence of the discursive identity in different parts
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of the world. Not only do d推erent parts of the globe react different to changes m the
real world, these changes are also likely to affect the interaction of different sets of
identity at the local level, and within the individual as well.
Changes to the international order
The rather complex relationships of Asia's major countries with the leaders of the
Cold War confrontation, the Soviet Union and the US indicates basic differences
between the hierarchical power structure that determined the international order
within the NATO and Warsaw Pact alliances, and patterns of power hierarchy and
international order in East Asia and its wider neighborhood (South and Central Asia).
From the age of nineteenth century European and US imperialism through the life and
death struggle of the Cold War, the globe seemed to be governed by a Darwinian
struggle for survival. Earlier visions of an international order centered on the study of
relations among more or less sovereign governments pursuing their respective domestic
and national interests. This order gave birth to mainstream theories about international
(political) relations (IPR).
The two invasions of Iraq, the Balkan wars of the nineties, the war in Afghanistan,
and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) are reminders that military power exercised by
governments of states remains one of the most important ingredients m the interna-
tional order. It also leaves deep imprints on the domestic and international political and
economic order. The exercise of military power, and the repercussions caused by them
deeply affect the identity of the (super) powers themselves. The GWOT has lasting
impacts not only in the 員eld of international relations, it has brought changes to
domestic and international Rnancial markets and the banking system, and raised the
issue of the defense of civil liberty rights in democracies not only in the US but also
among EU member states. As a result of government policies Great Britain now ranks
low in the EU with regard to the protection of privacy and civil liberties. The erosion
of actions of national sovereignty is not merely a consequence of peaceful transnational
economic transactions. The proposed EU constitution makes it compulsory for member
states to follow "market economics", thus limiting the freedom of choice of political
parties and the electorate.
Despite numerous discussions on regional cooperation in (South) East Asia, and
among countries of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia has so far been
unwilling, if not unable, to embark on regionalism European style. Different from
Europe, countries with a history of colonisation -and that includes the United States(!)
- are clearly averse to conceding part of their sovereignty, a cornerstone and basis of
a newly conceived national identity. This partially explains the fact that building a
NATO-like structure in Asia seems virtually impossible.
The international order conceived in terms of a franchise system
Mainstream IPR tends to associate globalization with a general erosion of the power
of the state, in particular its "sovereignty". Sovereignty is not only difficult to de負ne in
legal terms-vide changes from the nineteenth de員nition from the nineteenth to the
twenty一員rst centuries that have given rise to divergent de触itions used in international
law. "Cultural sovereignty" used to be an important part of sovereignty in the nine-
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teenth century, but is no longer so. Sovereignty is a building block of identity both in
the formal and informal sense, but key concepts of US-led globalization have accelerated
change in other states in a manner reminiscent of the franchise system known from the
business world. The early, un forced adoption of principles of a market economy by
Chinese leaders in the eighties was the first step in remolding the domestic order with
huge consequences for the international system as well. The adoption of new forms of
economic management may be compared to the owner of a shop who decides to join the
crowd of a franchise chain without giving up personal ownership.
A franchise enterprise is likely to bind the franchise takers into a lasting relation-
ship with franchise headquarters, often through practices highly questionable under
anti-monopoly or consumer protection laws. The structure of the international order
since World War II, dominated by alliance systems, may be likened to the rivalry among
two franchise enterprises: the Soviet one, and the project later to be known as market
democracy led by the United States. Both leaders endeavoured to spread their own
domestic order to their alliance partners. It is easy to see that the reality of governance
in Poland and Hungary followed lines fairly different from the Soviet Russian model,
nor did the members of the EU whose legal system was rooted mainly in French
traditions (Great Britain being the lone exception) adopt the Anglo-Saxon system of law.
The Soviet Union and the US considered themselves guardians of two different collec-
tive identities, and selectively handed out (economic) rewards and punishment for
members of their alliance systems in the pursuit of a more coherent identity. The
impact of global forms of governance pushed by international institutions such as the
World Bank or the International Monetary Fund on countries as d滑erent as China and
South Africa extends far beyond the economic realm, and touches on core elements of
national identity such as models for the reform of education systems, including the
privatization of universities and schools. We may liken the export of forms of organi-
sation in the political, cultural, social and economic sphere to the spread of a network of
franchise enteゆrises, not "owned" by company headquarters, but bound to it in a
complex set of relationships. Debates on particular policy issues (^'discourse") tend to be
structured by the pattern of the franchise headquarters irrespective of speciac local
conditions･ Discursive politics "spin doctors"), and psychological warfare have grown
more important than ever, and have become more effective in the age of the internet-
only partially offset by the active participation of single individuals.
Although this system exercises an important role in shaping and maintaining a
stable international order, stability still needs to be underwritten by the use, or the
threat of use of military power.
The future role of alliances in the internatio乃αI order
The inability of Asia to evolve regional alliance systems along European/Atlantic
lines was partially caused by Asia's di庁erent geopolitical texture, the evolution of
Japan s maritime based empire that attempted to control the East Asian continent as
well, and the complex, still continuing evolution of nation states in Asia that include
giants such as China, India, Russia and Indonesia, but also relative dwarfs such as
Mongolia, Singapore, and newly independent states such as Kirghizstan. In its early
phase the Cold War seemed to extend unchanged to Asia, where it split countries like
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Korea, China and Vietnam into territories rule by pro- and anti-communist govern-
merits. It soon became apparent that no Asian nation followed Soviet leadership the
way members of the Warsaw Pact were forced to do. Despite sharing an anti-commumst
identity, governments on Taiwan, in South Korea, Japan and beyond in the Philippines
and Indonesia were unwilling to join a common, US-led treaty organization. In addition
to the impact of "history , and specはc military and economic issues, it was deep
structural differences of identity that prevented the establishment of a NATO-like
organization in Asia. Forms of defence c0-operation such as TMD, NMD or AMD
increase the leverage of the US over its military partners in Asia. More recently efforts
are being made to increase defence cooperation between NATO, Japan and Australia as
revealed by the US President. Such efforts rather underline the continuing di魚culties
to establish more formal cooperation even m the face of the Korean and Middle Eastern
crises. China has repeatedly refused to answer to requests by one or the other member
of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to assist m building a quasi-alhance system.
The Six Party Talks on North Korea also aim at increasing China's participation and
role in a more formalized system for the security of Asia. The future of the Korean
peninsula remains uncertain, but it is hard to conceive a scenario in which Korea-
divided or united-would join with any of its neighbours in a formal alliance system.
Beyond the age of US and Europe-centred building of theory
The deep structure of the international order in Asia is not susceptible to concepts
of international relations theory derived from Europe and the Atlantic world without
major adaptations. I suggest that concepts rooted m an approach towards "identity are
a suitable tool to view the power structures of Asia m a more comprehensive way. To
do so requires a massive cooperation of scholars from Asia. Historians need to be
prepared to abandon Eur0-, or Western-centred approaches towards world history. It is
unlikely that the relatively small populations of the US and major EU members will
determine the course of world history single-handedly. Theories of international
(security and political) order will have to show that they are productive in developing
scenarios for East Asia言he Eurasian Continent, the Greater Middle East, and other parts
of the world. This will require a major change of the identities of these academic
disciplines.
Theoretical approaches towards "balance of power" need to focus more on factors
limiting the efficacy of the exercise of military power; they also need to take greater
account of the role of weak points, and the impact of anxieties among the leaders of
militarily strong nations. Traditional Asian concepts of security include "chaos , a
concept akin to the role of "anarchy , but usually place the focus on internal security
rather than chaos as a concept of international order.' Following the impact of
Darwinian concepts East Asian commentators heatedly debated the concept of "clash of
civilization more than a century before Samuel Huntmgton once more made the
concept popular m the West.
The increasing global division of labour makes for deep asymmetries m the global
economic and political order-at the same time, it increases interdependence and
mutually shared vulnerabilities, best visible in the way anancial currency markets link
all major currencies. I advocated the concept Mutual Assured Instability (MAI) (inspired
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by the MAD, Mutual Assured Destruction) as one factor working for increased systemic
stability, deterring the use of anancial/economic means for the destabilization of
opponents or enemies. Last but not least, the function of (nuclear) deterrence so well
known from the Cold War era has also undergone fundamental change affecting the
cohesion of US-led alliance systems. There are deep doubts in the US and elsewhere
whether North Korea, Pakistan, Iran and others might not consider suicidal attacks,
thus rendering the logic of mutual assured destruction useless in the post-Cold War
period. Any limitations to the credibility of the US (nuclear) umbrella is prone to cause
calls for greater self-su魚ciency of defence capabilities, and foster multipolarity - but it
is unlikely that greater Japanese defence capabilities are reason for joy in Beijing,
Pyongyang and elsewhere.
Storylines to trace globalization-franchise system, identity, non-constitutional ac-
tors
Above I suggested the comparison of the international order to a franchise system.
A second story line is "identity 'to denote the peculiar interaction between words and
deeds, possessing a characteristic pattern for institutions, organizations and individuals.
Such story lines are presented as a heuristic device for developing questions that may
contribute to the creation of hypotheses, and eventually allow us to build universally
valid theories, in which the much larger Asian reality is no longer perceived as atypical,
or exceptional from a theoretical point of view.
I employed "identity m a more technical sense, and not in the popular sense of "self
image. I use the term to denote a construct for justifying alternatives and choices for
future action. Once choices have been made and action implemented, "identity" is a
means to justify one s actions in terms that make it appear as consistent as possible with
the whole array of previous actions. "Identity" may agure in the form of an inner
monologue or dialogue, for internal use of individuals, or groups (organizations, institひ
tions). It may also be used to legitimize choices and actions to outsiders. The verbal
rationalization adopted may differ significantly from hidden, or unconscious motives
and intentions. Individuals and groups tend to present the positive consequences of
their actions as if they were intended, and to disown unfavorable consequences.
It follows that the consequences of actions may have a strong bearing on the
structure of identity. Defeat m war in particular, or upheavals such as the Cultural
Revolution in China, are examples of events with deep reverberations in the identity
discourse that may last decades.
One reason for adopting this de負nition was to avoid the popular, but superacial and
often highly misleading description of identity as a more or less Bxed canon of abstract
principles and norms inspiring group behavior. We notice this usage in pairs of
concepts such as "Asian or "Western", "catholic" versus "protestant", "Sunni" versus
Smite. Most popular ethic systems make extensive use of stories - often linked to icons
such as saints - that provide the opportunity for月Iexible interpretation that is needed to
translate rigid dogma into guidelines in a complex, and self-contradictory environment.
We encounter such simplistic usage in terms like Maoist, Stalinist, or fascist terms
lacking the required precision.
The de魚mtion of identity given above also takes into account the innate tension
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between moral values and political expediency, "might versus "right , or the tension
between Western democracy and the reality of European history-the twentieth
century in particular saw most of Europe ruled by one or the other dictatorial govern-
merit for extended periods, often lasting decades.
I should like to suggest an additional story line that involves the division of society
into institutions and organizations that formally constitute large units such as states,
replete with claims of an explicit, and fairly constant identity, and other institutions not
provided for in formal constitutions. An example might be Japan's "peace constitution'
that for a time cemented Japan's self-image as a "paCはst" nation. Such "constitutional'
identities include the potential for gradual evolution and change. The transition of
Japan's security relationship with the United States towards a full fledged military
alliance entails much more than a convenient re-interpretation of a distant constitution:
it has already changed the discourse used to describe Japan's national identity both at
home and abroad.
There is a wide variety of forces working towards such change: they include
political parties and sections of "civil society", a term derived from an "ideal type'
description of nineteenth century West European society, and further other forces in
society not subsumed by formal organs of the state. For want of a better term I suggest
the term "non-constitutional" institutions, thus including political parties whose role
lacks de魚nition m most constitutions. These days "civil society usually refers to an
institutionalized citizenry, gathered in organizations such as NGOs, rather than an
amorphous mass of "citizens.
The State, the armed forces and civil society: re-enter the elites of the global age
We are now ready to ask questions concerning the role of civil society and other
non-constitutional institutions, including political, economic and security elites, in
shaping and transforming the identity of polity and the economy both at the informal,
but also the formal level, as expressed in the change of written constitution, an issue
Japan faces in the near future. Non-constitutional forces are not limited to domestic
actors, but include foreign actors, as suggested by the term "franchise order.
The disasters caused by the Soviet and US invasion of Afghanistan, and the havoc
wrought in Iraq is rooted in serious shortcomings of intelligence. More importantly, it
demonstrates much more that military power is good at deconstructing, but not well at
reconstructing. Societies and identities cannot easily be rebuilt on the drawing board. A
major reason for this shortcoming is ignorance about the way military force can be used
to change identities and impose new types of governance to create a stable order. The
failure of Mao Zedong's attempt to rewrite the identity of all Chinese m his image during
the Cultural Revolution, or Soviet dreams of creating a "Soviet man' transcending
former identities belong to the same category. The acceptance or outright rejection of
identities pushed by elites can make, or break stable societies, and have long-lasting
international repercussions. Japan s invasions of its neighbors, resulting m the occupa-
tion of Korea and Taiwan, went far beyond the exploitation for narrowly deBned
economic or security interests. Japan also attempted to ruthlessly stamp out Korean
identity by imposing the of Japanese family names and force Koreans to attend Shinto
rituals m support of the Japanese emperor. Chinas post-1949 revolutionary project
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failed, both at home and at the international level. The Islamic world, Russia and some
South American countries provide more recent evidence that globalization dos not lead
to a smooth synchronization of political and other identities despite globalization.
It was Japan s pre-war Foreign Minister Matsuoka who fully understood the di魚C-
ulties of changing the identity of the ordinary Japanese. In a speech in 1940 he assured
his public that Japan would eventually evolve into a Fascist state, but that this could
not be achieved by force as in Germany.10
"Matsuoka talked along the following lines "for background" not (repeat not) for
attribution‥ ‥
Three. In the battle between democracy and totalitarianism the latter adversary
will without question win and will control the world‥ ‥
Four. Matsuoka said‥ ‥ Not months but years will be needed to weld Japan into
a totalitarian state, buHapanese totalitarianism will be unlike the European brand.
It is contrary to the Japanese character to be coerced into adopting an idea.
Concentration camps would be futile. The people would aght back. Fascism will
develop in Japan through the people's will. It will come out of love for the Emperor
but the people cannot be forced. It is because of the special system in Japan with the
Emperor at the head that the Japanese state is better adapted than any other state
to unify the nation in Fascism. ‥."
Five years later, Matsuoka's dreams were shattered. The history of rebuilding
Japan s identity entered a new phase.
Building a more predictable world?
Academic theories, like ideologies and other guides for action, tend to promise the
building of a predictable, rational world. Rational outcomes depend on a clear setting of
goals and a choice of means for their implementation contingent on a well disciplined
institutional system. No system, however clever designed, is able to guarantee such an
outcome-just like computer models depend on the input, the input usually supplied by
elites plays a decisive role. Systems may be designed to limit the arbitrariness of inputs,
or put brakes on "irrational" inputs. The greater the complexity of our civilizations the
greater the difficulty for any elite to process available information to produce rational
outcomes. It is deeply worrying that the ensuing difficulties of supervising elites and
their decision-making has created opportunities for misuse and abuse greater than ever
before. Democracy only has a future if it is created and supported at the grass roots
level, by the citizens themselves.
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